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PARTITION OF LAND AND MINERAL RIGHTS
Andrew L. Gates, III*
Partition is the division or distribution into distinct physical shares
of that which previously has been held in common.1 The need for par-
tition arises from the requirement that there be unanimous consent
of co-owners in managing commonly held property.! The action of par-
tition is based upon the principle that no one can be compelled to
hold property with another,' and it is available to anyone who does
hold property in common with another.'
The purpose of partition is to terminate ownership of undivided
fractional interests in the whole and to create perfect titles in in-
dividual physical portions of the former whole.5 If all of the co-owners
agree to the terms of the partition, all of the co-owners are
represented in the partition, and none of the co-owners is a minor
or an interdict, the partition may be voluntary and made in such form
and by such act as the co-owners agree upon.' If any of the co-owners
is a minor, an interdict, or an unrepresented absentee or if there is
not unanimous agreement on the terms of the partition, judicial pro-
ceedings are available to effect the partition.7
The right to partition is not without some limitations. Co-owners
may agree not to partition property owned in common for a certain
Copyright 1983, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* Member, Louisiana Bar Association.
1. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1293; Succession of Ramp, 252 La. 660, 666, 212 So. 2d
419, 421 (1968). This is true whether property owned in indivision is partitioned in
kind (with each former co-owner becoming the sole owner of a portion of the parti-
tioned property) or by licitation (resulting in the subsequent division or distribution
of the proceeds of the public sale).
2. For a discussion of some problems of co-ownership, see Denegre, Co-Ownership
of Oil and Gas Interests in Louisiana, 24 TUL. L. REV. 288 (1950); McLaughlin, Co-
Ownership and Partition of Mineral Rights in Louisiana, 27 INST. ON MIN. L. 135 (1980);
Shuey, Some Problems of Co-Ownership in Louisiana Mineral Law, 12 INST. ON MIN.
L. 63 (1965).
3. LA. CiV. CODE art. 1289. The right to partition against the United States, or
any branch or agency thereof has been limited by LA. R.S. 9:1701 (1950).
4. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1308; Fabacher v. Fabacher, 214 La. 939, 946, 39 So. 2d
426, 428 (1949). Determining whether property is held in common usually will deter-
mine whether partition is available. See infra notes 69-86 and accompanying text.
5. See Succession of Ramp, 252 La. 660, 668, 212 So. 2d 419, 422 (1968).
6. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1294, 1322. If the property to be partitioned is immovable,
the agreement of partition should be in writing. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2275; Fox v. Suc-
cession of Broussard, 161 La. 949, 952, 109 So. 773, 774 (1926).
7. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1294, 1323. If the partition is to be in kind, there is no
necessity for a judicial partition. However, the legal representatives of minors and
interdicts must obtain court authorization to act. See infra note 41 and accompanying
text.
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limited time,8 but a stipulation that there will never be a partition
of property owned in indivision is null." A donor or testator can order
that property given or bequeathed not be divided for a certain period
of time or until the happening of a certain condition, but this term
cannot exceed five years.'" Normally, there can be no such restriction
on that portion of the property reserved by law to the forced heirs."
One notable exception to this rule is that an ascendant may provide
in his will that no partition will be made among his minor children
or minor grandchildren inheriting from him during their minority or
until one of the children or grandchildren comes of age and demands
partition."2 Finally, there can be no partition when the use of the prop-
erty owned in common is indispensable to the use or enjoyment of
other property owned by the same co-owners, e.g., a co-owned entry
which serves as a passage to several houses owned by the same co-
owners.
13
If a partition is permanent and irrevocable, such as a judicial par-
tition, it is said to be definitive."' If a partition is not definitive, it
is provisional."
VENUE
If a judicial proceeding is necessary, as a general rule, the proper
venue is the parish where the property to be divided is situated, 6
and if immovable property to be partitioned is situated in more than
one parish, the action may be brought in any one of those parishes."
8. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1298.
9. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1297. An agreement to postpone partition must be for a
definite term or conditioned upon the happening of some event which will definitely
occur and will be easily recognized. Giardina v. Giardina, 181 La. 42, 158 So. 615 (1935).
10. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1299, 1300.
11. Succession of Manson, 168 La. 286, 121 So. 868 (1929); Succession of Manion,
143 La. 799, 79 So. 409 (1918).
12. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1301. If a testator divides his estate between his lawful
heirs and legatees, he, in effect, already has partitioned his estate, and therefore there
is no occasion for partition. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1302.
13. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1303.
14. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1295-1296.
15. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1295-1296. A provisional partition, like a definitive parti-
tion, necessitates joinder of all owners in indivision. Wheeler v. Mann, 149 La. 866,
90 So. 225 (1921).
16. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1291; LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 80.
17. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1291; LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 80. Prior to the enactment of
article 80 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, it was necessary to file a separate
action in each parish in which immovable property to be partitioned was situated unless
said property formed one contiguous tract. Johnston v. Burton, 202 La. 152, 158, 11
So. 2d 513, 515 (1942).
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Since a partition of succession property, community property, or part-
nership property is ancillary to the succession, dissolution of the com-
munity, or dissolution of the partnership, respectively, these pro-
ceedings can offer alternative venue possibilities. For example, until
such time as a judgment of possession is rendered, an action to parti-
tion the succession must be brought in the court in which the succes-
sion proceeding is pending."8 An action to partition the succession
brought in the court in which the succession proceeding is pending
is proper only as to those partitions which take place as part of the
succession proceeding between co-heirs, and an action to partition prop-
erty owned in indivision by the succession and another should be filed
in a separate proceeding. Moreover, once a judgment of possession
has been rendered, an action to partition the inherited property should
be initiated in a separate action and not as part of the succession
proceeding.19
An action to partition community property may be brought either
as an incident of the action to dissolve the community or as a separate
action in the parish where the judgment dissolving the community
was rendered, or if the parties own community immovable property,
the action may be brought in any parish where any of said immovable
property is situated.' Similarly, an action to partition partnership prop-
18. LA. CODE Civ. P. arts. 81, 3461.
19. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1292-1293; LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 81, comments (d), (e);
Fabacher v. Fabacher, 214 La. 940, 945, 39 So. 2d 426, 428 (1949); Medicis v. Medicis,
155 La. 171, 174, 99 So. 27, 28 (1924). As a practical matter, few partitions will be
effected in a succession proceeding because article 3462 of the Code of Civil Procedure
delays the right to petition for partition until such time as the heirs and legatees
can be sent into possession. Once heirs and legatees can be placed in possession, a
judgment of possession usually is rendered; then they will be co-owners rather than
coheirs and should file a separate action for partition. It has been suggested that arti-
cle 3462 should be amended to allow an heir who wishes to accept the succession to
partition immediately so as to avoid an administration as long as he is able to furnish
security for his share of the debts. Pascal, Heirs, Creditors and the Fisc Under Loui-
siana Legislation, 23 Loy. L. REV. 313 (1977).
20. LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 82. Prior to the enactment of article 82, LA. R.S. 13:4991
(Supp. 1954) (repealed 1961) provided that jurisdiction over the judicial partition of
a preexisting community of acquets and gains vested exclusively in the district court
of Louisiana having jurisdiction of the last matrimonial domicile and, in the absence
of such matrimonial domicile, jurisdiction vested exclusively in the court having jurisdic-
tion over the immovable property belonging to said community or the court having
jurisdiction over the principal immovable property; in the event such property was
located in more than one parish or in the absence of any immovables within Loui-
siana, jurisdiction vested in the court having jurisdiction of the principal movable effects
within the state. In Steere v. Marston, 228 La. 94, 81 So. 2d 822 (1955), the louisiana
Supreme Court .refused to apply this statute retroactively. Prior to 1954, there was
no special statute governing venue of suits to partition community property, but in
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erty may be brought either as an incident of the action to dissolve
the partnership or as a separate action in the court which rendered
the judgment dissolving the partnership, or if the partnership owns
immovable property, the action may be brought in the parish where
any of the immovable property is situated.21
PROCEDURE
Although a partition proceeding is an ordinary proceeding, 22 it
takes preference over other ordinary proceedings.23 A judicial parti-
tion is commenced by filing a petition requesting same in a court of
competent jurisdiction.24 Former Civil Code article 13245 provided that
every judicial partition had to be preceded by an inventory according
to the form prescribed for public inventories; however, it was held
that when partition was ordered by licitation,21 i.e., by public sale of
the property and division of the proceeds, there was no need for an
inventory because the property could be sold for whatever it would
bring.27 The Code of Civil Procedure now provides that a court "may
order" an inventory to be made of all property sought to be
partitioned. 28
Demoruelle v. Allen, 218 La. 603, 50 So. 2d 208 (1950), it was implied that venue was
proper before the tribunal having jurisdiction of the divorce or dissolution proceedings
as well as before a court of competent jurisdiction where the property to be divided
was situated.
21. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 83.
22. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 4603.
23. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 4605. Although a judicial partition is not a summary
proceeding, summary proceedings may be used for the homologation of a judicial par-
tition. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 2592(4).
24. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 4603.
25. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1324, repealed by 1960 La. Acts, No. 30, S 2, and replaced
by LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 4604.
26. For a detailed discussion and analysis of the term and concept of "licitation,"
see Comment, Licitation, 8 TUL. L. REV. 574 (1934). In this article, "licitation" is de-
fined as "the offering at auction of an object belonging in indivision to several per-
sons to be adjudicated to the highest and last bidder, in order to divide the price
among the coowners, in proportion to the share of each in the thing." Id. at 575 n.6.
The licitation is said to be declarative of title when the adjudication at auction is
to a co-owner and is said to be translative of title when the adjudication is to a stranger.
27. Green v. Small, 227 La. 401, 408, 79 So. 2d 497, 499 (1955); Barbarich v. Meyer,
154 La. 325, 327, 97 So. 459, 460 (1923).
28. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 4604. When an inventory is ordered, the inventory is
made in accordance with articles 3131-3137, which provide that a notary in each parish
in which the property to be partitioned is situated must be appointed to take the
inventory of such property in that parish. The appointed notary takes the inventory
in the presence of at least two competent witnesses, assisted by two competent ap-
praisers appointed and sworn by the notary. These witnesses and appraisers need
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The court is directed to effect the partition in the manner most
advantageous and convenient to the parties, 9 but unless the property
to be partitioned is indivisible by its nature or cannot conveniently
be divided, the court must order the partition to be made in kind."
There are exceptions to this general rule, however, and when one
or more of the co-owners is an absentee, the partition may be effected
by licitation whether the property is divisible in kind or not."
Naturally, if the absentee co-owner timely appears in the proceeding
and requests partition in kind, the court is still obligated to render
a judgment ordering the partition to be made in kind, assuming the
property sought to be partitioned is divisible in kind.2
When a partition by licitation has been ordered, the sale is held
at a public auction after proper publication of notice of the sale, but
the co-owners may agree upon a nonjudicial partition at any time prior
to the sale. A co-owner may purchase any property sold to effect
not be residents of the parish where the inventory is taken. The notary is required
to give notice by mail of the time and place of the taking of the inventory to any
person who timely requests notice. Any interested person or his attorney may attend
the taking of the inventory. The inventory is evidenced by the notary's proc~s ver-
bal of the proceedings, signed by the notary, appraisers, witnesses, and other persons
attending the taking of the inventory. Immediately upon the completion and signing
of the proc~s verbal, it is returned into the court which ordered it taken, and it is then
accepted as prima facie proof of all matters shown therein without homologa-
tion by the court. A detailed, descriptive list may be filed in lieu of an inventory,
and this privilege may be exercised without judicial authority. The descriptive list
also is accepted as prima facie proof of all matters shown therein, unless amended
or traversed successfully. Any interested person may traverse the inventory or the
descriptive list at any time by a contradictory motion served upon the notary and
person at whose instance the inventory was made, in the case of an inventory, or
upon the person filing the descriptive list when such a list has been filed in lieu of
an inventory. LA. CODE Civ. P. arts. 3131-3137. This right to traverse the inventory
"at any time" affords some possibility for abuse and delay by anyone resisting the
partition. See, e.g., Succession of Smith, 247 La. 921, 175 So. 2d 269 (1965) (motion
to traverse was filed after the property involved had been sold in the proceeding).
29. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 4605; LA. CIv. CODE art. 1336.
30. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1337; LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 4606; Babineaux v. Babineaux,
237 La. 806, 811, 112 So. 2d 620, 621 (1959). Civil Code article 1340 states that "a
thing cannot be conveniently divided when a diminution of its value, or loss or in-
convenience of one of the owners, would be the consequence of dividing it." There
is diminution of value when the total value of the individual divided shares is less
than the value of the property as a whole. Babineaux, 237 La. at 813 n.4, 112 So.
2d at 622 n.4. This presumption in favor of partition in kind can be reversed if a
mineral right granted by fewer than all of the co-owners burdens the property. See
infra notes 120-125 and accompanying text.
31. LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 4621.
32. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 4630.
33. LA. CiV. CODE arts. 1339, 1346; LA. CODE Civ. P. arts. 2331-2343, 4607.
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a partition, whether the sale is by licitation or by private sale. 4 It
is not necessary to serve any party with notice of seizure prior to
the sale of property to be partitioned at public auction. 5 Furthermore,
a judgment ordering a partition by licitation and directing that prop-
erty be sold at public sale is a final judgment that cannot be collateral-
ly attacked.3"
If a partition by licitation is desired when one of the co-owners
is an absentee, the petition must be supported by an affidavit that
the allegations contained therein are true87 and notice of the institu-
tion of the proceeding must be published at least once in the parish
where the proceeding is pending. Once the public sale has been con-
summated pursuant to judgment, the absentee, his succession
representative, and his heirs are precluded from asserting any right,
title, or interest in the property.39 The undivided interest in property
owned by a minor or an interdict also may be sold to effect a parti-
tion, and said interest may be purchased by a co-owner."0 Tutors of
minors and curators of interdicts also ma obtain court authorization
to agree to a partition in kind without the drawing of lots, thereby
eliminating the need for a judicial partition.41
34. LA. CODE CIv. P. arts. 4614, 4641.
35. See, e.g., Gauthreaux v. Gauthreaux, 377 So. 2d 567, 570 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1979); Kees v. Michael, 376 So. 2d 1282, 1284 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979).
36. See, e.g., Hollingsworth v. Caldwell, 195 La. 30, 35, 196 So. 10, 12 (1940); Barnes
v. Perkins, 201 So. 2d 324, 327 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
37. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 4622.
38. LA. CODE Civ. P. arts. 4623-4624; LA. R.S. 43:203 (1950 & Supp. 1961 & 1972).
The absentee's share of the proceeds of the sale are deposited in the registry of the
court for the account of the absentee, and this deposit may be withdrawn only on
order of the court. There are deducted from the absentee's share of the proceeds his
portion of the court costs and expenses of the sale, the fee awarded by the court
to the attorney appointed to represent him, and any amount required by the court
to be paid to a co-owner as reimbursement for payment of taxes or expenses. LA.
CODE Civ. P. arts. 4625-4629.
39. LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 4627. Where real property is partitioned in any man-
ner whatsoever, any co-owner not a party thereto is not affected by the partition and
his interest remains the same as if the property had not been partitioned. Never-
theless, the partition shall be valid as to the parties thereto, their heirs, and their
assigns. LA. R.S. 13:4985-4990 (Supp. 1952).
40. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 4641.
41. LA. CODE CIV. P. arts. 4642-4643. The tutor of a minor or the curator of an
interdict must obtain court authorization to sell or exchange any interest in the prop-
erty to be partitioned. LA. CODE Civ. P. arts. 4271, 4301-4304, 4321-4323, 4341-4342,
4554. If the interest of an incompetent conflicts with that of his legal representative,
the court is authorized to appoint an attorney to represent the incompetent in the
partition. A tutor or curator and an undertutor or undercurator may be appointed
1124 [Vol. 43
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PARTITION OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY
Partition of community property and settlement of claims arising
from matrimonial regimes are now provided for in Louisiana Revised
Statutes 9:2801, enacted by Act 439 of 1982. This new statute allows
either spouse to institute a proceeding in which each party files a
sworn detailed descriptive list of all community property indicating
the fair market value and location of each asset and all community
liabilities. Each party then either traverses or concurs in the inclusion
or exclusion of each asset and liability and the valuations listed in
the detailed descriptive list of the other party. The trial of the
traverses may be by summary or by ordinary procedure to determine
the community assets and liabilities, but the valuation of assets is
to be determined at the trial on the merits. In its discretion, the court
may determine all issues at one hearing and may appoint experts to
assist in the partition of community property.
The court must divide the community assets and liabilities so that
each spouse receives property of an equal net value by allocating or
assigning to the respective spouses all of the community assets and
liabilities. The allocation of a liability to a spouse obligates that spouse
to extinguish the liability, but this allocation does not affect the rights
of creditors. In the event that the allocation of assets and liabilities
results in an unequal net distribution, the court shall order the pay-
ment of a sum of money to equalize the distribution, and the court
may also order the execution of notes, mortgages, or other documents
as it deems necessary. In the event that the allocation of an asset
would be inequitable to one of the parties, the court may order the
parties to draw lots for the asset or may order the private sales of
the asset on such terms and conditions as the court deems proper.
Only in the event that an asset cannot be allocated to a party, assigned
by the drawing of lots, or sold at private sale, shall the court order
a partition thereof by licitation. In such event, the court must ex-
pressly state the reasons why the asset cannot be allocated, assigned
by the drawing of lots, or sold at private sale.
PARTITIONS BY PARENTS AMONG THEIR DESCENDANTS
Fathers, mothers, and other ascendants may partition their prop-
erty among their children and descendants either by designating the
amount of the portions which they assign to each or by designating
the property that is to compose each's respective share." These par-
to serve under oath without bond to represent an absentee incompetent who is not
otherwise represented. LA. R.S. 9:603 (1950), as amended by 1960 LA. Acts, No. 31, 5 2.
42. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1724.
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titions may be made by a donation inter vivos, having only present
property for its object, or by testament.43 If all of the property of
the ascendant on the day of his death has not been included in the
partition, the excluded property is divided according to law." A par-
tition made by testament or donation inter vivos may be set aside
when the advantage to one of the descendants exceeds the disposable
portion, but an attempt to rescind the partition may be circumvented
by offering to the complaining heir the supplement of the portion to
which he has a right. 5 Although the rescission of the partition does
not nullify any donation made as an advantage, the partition is null
and void in its entirety if any of the children living at the time of
the ascendant's death or any of the descendants of predeceased
children are omitted therefrom. 6
PRESCRIPTION
In a partition, the co-owners warrant to each other the property
that each acquires against disturbance and eviction from a cause
arising before the partition.47 The action of warranty prescribes in
five years, but this five-year period does not commence until the day
of the eviction.48
An action to rescind a partition is prescribed by five years, but
this prescription only commences against minors after they reach their
majority.49 Although it appears that collation is an incident to the par-
tition of a succession, it has been held that the five-year prescriptive
period provided for with respect to the rescission of partitions does
not apply to collation." The ten-year prescription provided for in Civil
Code article 3544 applies to a demand for collation, and this prescrip-
tion begins to run from the date of death of the person to whose
succession collation is to be made.5 1
Prescription does not run against the action of partition as long
as the property remains in common,52 and as a general rule, co-owners
43. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1725-1726.
44. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1728.
45. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1730-1732.
46. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1729, 1733.
47. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1384.
48. LA. Civ. CODE art. 1396.
49. LA. CIv. CODE art. 3542, as amended by 1980 La. Acts, No. 308, § 1.
50. Successions of Webre, 247 La. 461, 172 So. 2d 285 (1965).
51. Id. "Collation" is the return of property to the succession in order assure equal
distribution of an ascendant's property among his direct descendants. LA. CiV. CODE
arts. 1251-1253.
52. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1304; Sibley v. Pierson, 125 La. 478, 51 So. 502 (1910).
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cannot acquire title by prescription against each other. 3 This is
because the possession of one co-owner is presumed to be for the
benefit of all co-owners. On the other hand, if one of the co-owners
can prove continuous, uninterrupted separate possession for thirty
years, he can successfully oppose an action for partition." To rebut
the presumption of precarious possession and obtain the advantage
of acquisitive prescription, a co-owner must actually possess the prop-
erty in an open and hostile manner and declare his intention to possess
adversely to the other co-owners. It has been held that the filing of
record of an act of partition can furnish the basis for notice of adverse
possession." Presumably, adverse possession by a co-owner must be
of the same quality, extent, and duration as the possession required
of a bad faith adverse possessor without title, rather than the posses-
sion required of a good faith purchaser by deed translative of title,
whereby possession of part of the property constitutes possession of
the whole."
When a co-owner acquires perfect ownership in a particular tract
by an act of partition, the act is not translative of title, but rather
is declarative of title, and the instrument cannot support a title based
on ten-year acquisitive prescription. 7 However, if one co-owner pur-
portedly conveys all of the property owned in indivision to a good
faith purchaser, said purchaser may acquire title to the entirety of
the property in ten years by acquisitive prescription. 8
MORTGAGES
In a judicial partition where the property is divided in kind, mort-
53. See, e.g., Lee v. Jones, 224 La. 231, 236, 69 So. 2d 26, 28 (1953).
54. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1305; Rhodes v. Cooper, 113 La. 600, 37 So. 527 (1904).
It has been suggested that article 1305 merely affirms Civil Code article 3499, pro-
viding for acquisitive prescription of immovables by possession for 30 years without
any need of title or good faith. Lee v. Jones, 224 La. 231, 236, 69 So. 2d 26, 28 (1953).
If, through possession, a co-owner acquires perfect ownership of only a portion of the
property owned in common, the action of partition remains available with respect to
that property not acquired through acquisitive prescription. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1306,
1321.
55. Minton v. Whitworth, 393 So. 2d 294, 297 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980); Dupuis
v. Broadhurst, 213 So. 2d 528, 532 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ refused, 252 La. 967, 215
So. 2d 131 (1968).
56. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 3435, 3486, 3487 (replacing former LA. CIV. CODE arts.
3499-3503; see 1982 La. Acts, No. 187, S 1); Seven Water Holes Corp. v. Spires, 393
So. 2d 811 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1981); William T. Burton Indus., Inc. v. Cook, 322 So.
2d 880 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975). But see Cheramie v. Cheramie, 391 So. 2d 1126 (La. 1980).
57. LA. CIv. CODE art. 3483 (as revised 1982); Tyson v. Spearman, 190 La. 871,.
183 So. 201 (1938); Tillery v. Fuller, 190 La. 586, 182 So. 683 (1938).
58. Ogden v. Leland Univ., 49 La. Ann. 190, 21 So. 685 (1896).
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gages, liens, and privileges existing against only one of the co-owners
attach to the property allotted to him and cease to encumber the prop-
erty allotted to the remaining co-owners.5 9 If the owner whose share
is mortgaged is entitled to a payment of money because his share
is of less value than the remaining shares, the owing parties must
retain said sums, which are secured by a mortgage on the owing par-
ties' respective shares and are subject to the demands of the mort-
gagees of the owing parties' former co-owner."0 In a judicial parti-
tion by licitation, if the mortgagees and holders of liens and privileges
are made parties to the partition, the mortgages, liens, and privileges
are transferred to the proceeds of the sale.61
In Sutton v. Sutton,2 a mortgage remained effective against former
community property purchased at a public partition sale where the
mortgagee was not made a party to the partition proceeding. Similar-
ly, in Beene v. Wilbur," a mortgage holder was not made a party to
the partition proceeding, and therefore the property passed to the
purchaser at the sale subject to the mortgage. In Beene, the mortgage
was enforceable by foreclosure under executory process, and a subse-
quent sheriff's sale to enforce the mortgage was held valid. Unless
the mortgagee is actually made a party to the suit, the mortgage will
not be extinguished. This is true even when the mortgagee has actual
notice of the partition proceeding, since a mortgagee is not required
to intervene in the proceeding nor obligated to bid at the public sale
to protect his interest.
Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:503165 now provides that no lien or
privilege shall be cancelled, removed from the public records, or
affected by any public or private sale of property in a partition pro-
ceeding. Similarly, Louisiana Revised Statutes 6:83366 provides that
no mortgage in favor of an association67 can be cancelled, removed
59. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1338, 1383; Anglin v. Kilbourne, 131 La. 186, 59 So. 116
(1912); Bank of Jeanerette v. Stansbury, 110 La. 301, 34 So. 452 (1903).
60. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1338.
61. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1338; Vincent v. Vincent, 168 La. 63, 121 So. 303 (1929);
Prichard v. McCranie, 160 La. 605, 107 So. 461 (1926); Succession of Williams, 138 La.
383, 70 So. 334 (1915).
62. 320 So. 2d 597 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975).
63. 388 So. 2d 435 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 393 So. 2d 738 (La. 1980).
64. 388 So. 2d at 437.
65. Added by 1980 La. Acts, No. 356, S 1, and amended by 1981 La. Acts, No. 894,
51.
66. Added by 1970 La. Acts, No. 234, S 1, and amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 689,
1; 1981 La. Acts, No. 292, S 1; 1981 La. Acts, No. 328, 5 1.
67. LA. R.S. 6:701(1) (Supp. 1970) defines "association" as "a savings association,
homestead, building and loan association, savings and loan association or society sub-
ject to the provisions of [LA. R.S. 6:701-6:950.10 (Supp. 1970)]."
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from the public records, or affected by a sale in a partition proceeding
unless prior to the petition for sale, at least ten days' written notice
of the sale is given by certified or registered mail to the association
in whose favor the mortgage was executed.8
HOLDING IN COMMON
The Civil Code clearly provides that no one can be compelled to
hold property in common with another. 9 However, a demand for par-
tition may be thwarted by a determination that property is not in
fact "held in common," and it should be noted that the mere owner-
ship of some right or rights in property in which another owns some
right or rights is not synonymous with holding in common. An owner
of property may have one or more of the elements of ownership, i.e.,
the right to use the property (usus), to enjoy the fruits of the prop-
erty (fructus), and to dispose of the property (abusus) within the limits
and under the conditions established by law."0 Thus, perfect, or full,
ownership consists of the right to use, the right to enjoy, and the
right to dispose of the property." The usufructuary is entitled to the
fruits of the property"2 as well as the use of the property," but he
may not dispose of the property. The naked owner may dispose of
the naked ownership, and he also may alienate or encumber the prop-
erty subject to the usufruct. 4
Usufruct is susceptible to division, and it may be partitioned
among the usufructuaries.' Similarly, the naked ownership may be
partitioned among the naked owners subject to the rights of the
usufructuary,"6 and perfect owners may demand partition among
themselves."
In Smith v. Nelson,"8 a naked owner demanded partition by licita-
tion against the usufructuary, but the court concluded that there was
68. This notice may be waived by the association if the waiver is in writing and
is filed with the court authorizing or ordering the sale. LA R.S. 6:833(I) (Supp. 1970).
69. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1289, 1308. For a detailed analysis of what constitutes
"holding in common," see Note, Civil Law Property-Partition of Land Subject to a
Usufruct, 24 LA. L. REV. 885 (1964).
70. LA. CIV. CODE art. 477; Amerada Petroleum Corp. v. Reese, 195 La. 359, 196
So. 558 (1940); In re Morgan R.R. & S.S. Co., 32 La. Ann. 371 (1880).
71. Giroir v. Dumesnil, 248 La. 1037, 1050, 184 So. 2d 1, 6 (1966).
72. LA. CIv. CODE art. 550.
73. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 539, 566.
74. LA. CIv. CODE art. 603.
75. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 541, 1309.
76. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 542, 1309.
77. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1289.
78. 121 La. 170, 46 So. 200 (1908).
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no basis for the action of partition because there was no property
"held in common" -the title had been dismembered and each part was
a distinct thing held by a different owner. 9 It is clear, therefore, that
naked owners cannot force a partition against usufructuaries nor can
usufructuaries compel a partition against naked owners.
In Devillier v. Devillier,8" the third circuit ruled that some co-
owners could not burden their interests with a usufruct in favor of
a third person which would thereby extinguish the rights of another
co-owner to obtain a partition by licitation. Plaintiff was one of four
children who inherited the separate property of their deceased mother
in perfect ownership. The three children other than plaintiff granted
a usufruct in favor of their father burdening their undivided three-
fourths interest, and plaintiff sought and was granted partition by
licitation against her father and three siblings. While there is no
dispute that article 543 of the Civil Code permits partition in kind
in a situation such as this to enable a co-owner of an undivided in-
terest to acquire perfect ownership in a definite part of the property
in question, it seems equally clear that article 543 prohibits partition
by licitation in such a case."'
Civil Code article 543 was partly misinterpreted in Devillier when
the court declared that the policy statement embodied in the article
is to the effect that "there can be no partition by licitation if'there
is a person who is both a usufructuary and owner.' "8 Finding no per-
son who was both an owner and a usufructuary, the court allowed
partition by licitation. The court interpreted article 543 as forbidding
partition by licitation only if a person was both a usufructuary and
owner, but the language of the article precludes partition by licita-
tion even though there is such a person. Thus, article 543, when read
as a whole, permits partition in kind, free of any usufruct, to enable
79. 121 La. at 174, 46 So. at 201.
80. 371 So. 2d 1230 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 373 So. 2d 546 (La. 1979), dis-
cussed in Note, Civil Law Property-Civil Code Article 543 and the Prohibition of Parti-
tion by Licitation of Property Subject to a Usufruct, 55 TUL. L. REV. 224 (1980).
81. Louisiana Civil Code article 543 provides as follows:
A coowner whether or not he is also a usufructuary of an undivided part of a
thing may demand its partition in kind to the extent necessary to enable him
to obtain the perfect ownership of a determined part. Partition by licitation is
not allowed even though there is a person who is both a usufructuary and an owner.
(Emphasis added.) See also Humble v. John W. Nugier Real Estate & Ins. Agency,
380 So. 2d 206 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 381 So. 2d 1235 (La. 1980) (granting
partition in kind to owner of undivided one-half interest in suit against the naked
owner and the usufructuary of the other one-half interest, and affirming the validity
of Devillier).
82. 371 So. 2d at 1236 (quoting LA. CiV. CODE art. 543) (emphasis added).
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a co-owner to obtain perfect ownership of a particular part of the
property held in common, but partition by licitation is not allowed
to accomplish this notwithstanding there is a person who is both a
usufructuary and an owner. The court in Devillier ignored the literal
wording of article 543 and allowed partition by licitation of property
subject to a usufruct.s3
In Pasternack v. Samuels,14 the Louisiana Supreme Court was
presented with the same issue presented in Devillier, i.e., whether
the owner of an undivided interest in full ownership of property sub-
ject to an outstanding usufruct may demand partition by licitation.
Relying on the "clear wording" of article 543, the court decided that
partition by licitation was not allowed and suggested that any requlests
for changes in the article be addressed to the legislature.' While the
wording of article 543 is clear, it has been suggested that the policy
considerations behind the article indicate that its wording is clearly
wrong.' Meanwhile, there is no sound basis for distinguishing Devillier
from Pasternack.
PREDIAL SERVITUDES
A predial servitude on land owned in indivision must be
established with the consent of all of the co-owners. However, if a
co-owner purports to establish a predial servitude on the entire estate,
the act is not null, but its execution is suspended until the consent
of all of the co-owners is obtained.'
If a predial servitude is granted by all of the co-owners, it will
burden the land and will not be affected by a subsequent partition
of the servient estate. If the servient estate is sold pursuant to parti-
tion by licitation, the purchaser acquires the property subject to the
preexisting servitude. If partition is made in kind, each divided tract
may be burdened by the preexisting servitude in accordance with the
rules governing division of the servient estate.8
83. Pasternack v. Samuels, 415 So. 2d 211, 213 n.4 (La. 1982).
84. 415 So. 2d 211 (La. 1982).
85. Id. at 213-14.
86. See Pasternack v. Samuels, 415 So. 2d at 214-15 (Calogero, J., dissenting); Note,
Civil Code Article 543 and the Problem of Partition by Licitation of Property Subject
to a Usufruct, 43 LA. L. REV. 787 (1983); Note, Civil Law Property-Civil Code Article
543 and the Prohibition of Partition by Licitation of Property Subject to Usufruct, 55
TUL. L. REV. 224 (1980); Note, Civil Law Property-Partition of Land Subject to a
Usufruct, 24 LA. L. REV. 885 (1964).
87. LA. CIv. CODE art. 714; Greater Baton Rouge Port Comm'n v. Morley, 232
La. 87, 93 So. 2d 912 (1957).
88. Goodwin v. Sanders, 231 So. 2d 727 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970); see Yiannopoulos,
Predial Servitudes, 29 LA. L. REV. 1 (1968).
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Any co-owner who has consented to the establishment of a predial
servitude may not prevent its exercise because of another co-owner's
failure to consent. Moreover, if a co-owner consents to the establish-
ment of a servitude and later becomes the sole owner of the servient
estate by terminating the indivision, the servitude will continue to
burden the property. 9
When a co-owner consents to the establishment of a predial ser-
vitude on his undivided part of the property only, the exercise of the
servitude is suspended until the state of indivision is terminated.9"
If partition is made in kind, the servitude established will burden only
that property allotted to the co-owner establishing the servitude, but
if the partition is by licitation, the servitude will burden the entire
estate if the co-owner establishing the servitude acquires the prop-
erty and the right to the servitude will be extinguished if the entire
estate is conveyed to any person other than the one granting the
right.91 In the event that the conditional right is terminated by a sale
of the servient estate to one other than the granting co-owner, there
is no longer an express provision obligating the granting co-owner
to return the purchase price. 2
MINERAL RIGHTS
The Louisiana Mineral Code93 contains specific articles on co-
ownership94 and partition. 5 If these articles do not explicitly or im-
pliedly provide for a particular situation, the pertinent articles of the
Civil Code or the Code of Civil Procedure are applicable. On the
other hand, to the extent that the provisions of the Mineral Code
89. LA. CIv. CODE art. 715.
90. LA. CIv. CODE art. 716.
91. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 717, 718. If a co-owner attempts to create a predial ser-
vitude burdening the commonly held tract without the consent of his co-owners, the
acquiring party receives only a conditional right which does not become absolute unless
and until the grantor or his successor acquires ownership of the entire estate or a
divided part of it at the termination of the indivision. See LA. CiV. CODE arts. 716
& 718, comments. The successor of the co-owner who has consented to the establish-
ment of the servitude occupies the same position as his ancestor. LA. CIV. CODE art.
719.
92. Prior to the enactment of 1977 La. Acts, No. 154, S 1, articles 740 and 741
of the Louisiana Civil Code required the grantor to return the price which he had
received for his consent to establish the predial servitude.
93. LA. R.S. 31:1-31:215 (1974).
94. LA. R.S. 31:164-31:177 (1974).
95. LA. R.S. 31:167, 31:172-31:173, 31:178-31:187 (1974).
96. LA. R.S. 31:2 (1974).
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are in conflict with the provisions of the Civil Code or other laws,
the articles of the Mineral Code prevail.'
Although the ownership of land does not include the ownership
of oil, gas, and other minerals occurring naturally in liquid or gaseous
form, such ownership does include the exclusive right to explore and
develop property for the production of such minerals and the exclusive
right to reduce such minerals to possession and ownership.9" A land-
owner may create basic mineral rights such as the mineral servitude,
the mineral royalty, and the mineral lease, and these rights are
alienable and heritable real rights. 9 A mineral right is an incorporeal
immovable, susceptible of ownership in indivision,"' and its situs is
the parish or parishes in which the land burdened by the mineral
right is located."°
A co-owner of land may grant a mineral servitude, a mineral
royalty, and a mineral lease affecting his undivided interest in the
land, but the servitude owner and the mineral lessee may not exer-
cise their rights without the consent of the other co-owners of the
land.2 Although a servitude owner may not "exercise his right" and
a lessee may not "exercise his rights" without the consent of the other
co-owners of the land, the servitude owner and the lessee nevertheless
should each be entitled to receive his proportionate part of produc-
tion in the event of production attributable to the land burdened by
the servitude or lease. For example, if a well were drilled in the
97. Id.
98. LA. R.S. 31:6 (1974). Ownership of land does include ownership of minerals oc-
curring naturally in a solid state, but until reduced to possession, such minerals are
insusceptible of ownership apart from the land. LA. R.S. 31:5 (1974). Minerals are
reduced to possession when they are under physical control that permits delivery to
another. LA. R.S. 31:7 (1974).
99. LA. R.S. 31:16, 31:18 (1974).
100. LA. R.S. 31:168 (1974).
101. LA. R.S. 31:18 (1974). Mineral rights are subject to the laws of registry and
also are subject to prescription of nonuse for ten years except under special circumstances
when a mineral right may be considered imprescriptible. See, e.g., LA. R.S. 31:149-52
(1974 & Supp. 1976 & 1980).
102. LA. R.S. 31:164-66 (1974). A mineral servitude is the right of enjoyment of land
belonging to another for the purpose of exploring for and producing minerals and reducing
them to possession and ownership. LA. R.S. 31:21 (1974). A mineral lease is a contract
whereby the lessee is granted the right to explore for and produce minerals. LA. R.S.
31:114 (1974). A mineral royalty is the right to participate in production of minerals
from land owned by another or from land subject to a mineral servitude owned by another.
LA. R.S. 31:80 (1974). Since a mineral royalty is a passive interest, it is not necessary
for the royalty owner to obtain the consent of the co-owner of the party creating the




vicinity of the land burdened by the servitude or lease and a com-
pulsory unit"'3 was formed which included the land in question, the
mineral servitude owner and the lessee would be entitled to receive
their proportionate part of production from that well even without
the consent of the remaining co-owners.0 4 This is particularly true
since the co-owner of a mineral servitude may create a mineral royalty
out of his interest in the servitude and the consent of the co-owner
of the servitude is not necessary to entitle the royalty owner to receive
his proportionate part of production." A co-owner of a mineral lease
also may create nonoperating, dependent rights such as production
payments, net profits interests, and overriding royalty interests or
he may transfer all or part of his undivided interest, all without the
consent of his co-owner.'
The Mineral Code provides that co-owners of land constituting
a continuous whole may partition the property and reserve a single
mineral servitude in favor of one or more of them.0 7 In GMB Gas
Corp. v. Cox,"'0 property was partitioned, but there was no partition
made of the minerals underlying said property which remained owned
in indivision. Some co-owners had granted a mineral lease prior to
the partition, and the nonconsenting co-owner sought an injunction
prohibiting operations and production by the mineral lessee. The
second circuit ordered the issuance of the injunction and held that
a co-owner of a mineral servitude may not conduct operations on lands
subject to the servitude without the consent of the other co-owner.
103. LA. R.S. 31:213(5) (1974).
104. The comment to article 165 of the Mineral Code states that since the creation
of a mineral royalty does not confer an active use right in the same sense that a
mineral servitude confers such a right, there is no reason to require the consent of
co-owners to the participation by the owner of a mineral royalty in production. For
the same reason, there is no reason to require the consent of co-owners to the par-
ticipation by the owner of a mineral servitude or a mineral lessee in an interest in
production. While this may seem obvious to most practitioners, a literal reading of
the Mineral Code articles and the official comments could yield a different result. The
comment further states that "actual participation in production without the consent
of all co-owners does no violence to the basic rule requiring unanimous consent; for
there to be production there will have had to be consent to the exercise of a ser-
vitude or the granting of a lease." The latter quoted language is not necessarily true
when land has been included within the surface boundaries of a compulsory unit.
105. LA. R.S. 31:82, 31:170 (1974).
106. LA. R.S. 31:171 (1974).
107. LA. R.S. 31:67 (1974); see also Wall v. Leger, 402 So. 2d 704 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1981). There was some question whether this was possible prior to the enactment
of the Mineral Code. See GMB Gas Corp. v. Cox, 340 So. 2d 638 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1976); Whitehall Oil Co., Inc. v. Heard, 197 So. 2d 672 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
108. 340 So. 2d 638 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976).
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The court noted that the co-owners granting the mineral lease.were
not without a remedy since a partition of the mineral servitude was
authorized by article 172 of the Mineral Code." 9
In the related case of Cox v. Sanders, ° the landowner sought a
judgment cancelling all mineral servitudes affecting her property,
based on the accrual of liberative prescription for ten years of nonuse.
The landowner was also a co-owner of the mineral servitude which
had been established by a partition agreement, but the landowner
had refused to execute a mineral lease that had been executed by
the other co-owner of the mineral servitude. The mineral lessee ob-
tained production from the servitude tract, but the landowner con-
tended that drilling operations and production did not interrupt
prescription since she, a co-owner, was not a party to the lease and
had rejected all benefits from it. The court noted that although the
landowner, as co-owner of the mineral servitude, could enjoin opera-
tions by the lessee of her co-owner,"' any production obtained from
the land burdened by the servitude would interrupt prescription for
nonuse. The supreme court concluded that the controlling law was
the pre-Mineral Code law between landowner and mineral right owner
and not the codal provisions applicable to co-owners of mineral rights
on which the second circuit had based its decision." 2 The result should
have been the same whether or not the Mineral Code applied, since
articles 174 and 175 of the Mineral Code provide that even though
a co-owner of a mineral servitude may not conduct operations on the
property burdened by the servitude without the consent of the other
109. Id. at 641. No evidence was presented in this case to indicate that the co-
owner granting the mineral lease was acting to prevent waste or the extinction of
the mineral servitude.
110. 421 So. 2d 869 (La. 1982).
111. The landowner in this action, in fact, had obtained an injunction against the
lessee of the co-owner of the mineral servitude in GMB Gas Corp. v. Cox. In 1977,
the mineral lease was cancelled, and the co-owner of the mineral servitude that had
executed the lease contended that production obtained prior to the injunction had in-
terrupted prescription running against the mineral servitude.
112. 421 So. 2d at 871-72. The second circuit, in Cox v. Sanders, 421 So. 2d 1257
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1982), concluded that drilling and production by the lessee without
the consent of the landowner and co-owner of the mineral servitude was neither such
use of the servitude nor such good faith operation as would interrupt running of the
prescription of nonuse. The court based its conclusion on Mineral Code articles 29,
36, 41, 42 and 175. When the lease in question was executed, the mineral servitude
had an additional six-year term of existence, and therefore the court felt that article
176 authorizing one co-owner to act to prevent waste or extinction of the servitude
was not applicable. To prevent a "freeze out" by a combination landowner and ser-
vitude co-owner, the court suggested the remedy of partition of the mineral servitude
pursuant to article 172 of the Mineral Code. 409 So. 2d at 1261.
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co-owner, a use or possession of a mineral right inures to the benefit
of all co-owners of the right. The comments following these articles
state that the articles preserve the established law, and the precodal
law clearly provided that if one co-owner of a mineral servitude acted
without the consent of another co-owner, the operations would inter-
rupt prescription as to all co-owners and the nonoperator could claim
his share of production less his proportionate share of drilling and
operating costs."'
The Mineral Code specifically provides that mineral servitudes
and mineral royalties are subject to partition... and that co-owners
of the lessee's interest in a mineral lease may compel partition of their
rights.' 5 However, co-owners of overriding royalties, production
payments, net profits interests, and other dependent rights created
by fewer than all of the co-owners of the lessee's interest cannot be
compelled to partition their rights.1 6
As stated previously, although a use or possession of a mineral
right inures to the benefit of all co-owners of the right, a co-owner
of a mineral servitude may not conduct operations on the property
subject to the servitude without the consent of the other co-owner,
nor may a co-owner of a mineral lease independently conduct opera-
tions without the consent of his co-owner."' However, a co-owner of
a mineral servitude may act independently to prevent waste or the
extinction of the servitude, but he does so at his own risk and he
cannot impose any liability on his co-owner "for any costs incurred
except those arising out of production. 1 .. Similarly, a co-owner of a
113. LA. R.S. 31:174-175, comments (1974). For expression of the law existing before
enactment of the Mineral Code, see Taylor v. Dunn, 233 La. 617, 97 So. 2d 415 (1957);
Huckabay v. Texas Co., 227 La. 191, 78 So. 2d 829 (1955); Hodges v. Norton, 200 La.
614, 8 So. 2d 618 (1942); Lowry v. MRT Exploration Co., 382 So. 2d 1034 (La. App.
2d Cir.), writ refused, 385 So. 2d 793 (La. 1980).
114. LA. R.S. 31:172 (1974).
115. LA. R.S. 31:173 (1974).
116. Id. Since these dependent rights are passive interests in the economic benefits
derived from production attributable to a mineral lease, there is no active use right
involved and, therefore, no need for a right to compel partition of the interest. Generally,
production is sold, and the owners of these interests receive only their proportionate
share of the proceeds. Id., comment.
117. LA. R.S. 31:174-77 (1974); Hodges v. Norton, 200 La. 614, 8 So. 2d 618 (1942).
If one co-owner of a servitude acts without the consent of the other, the nonconsen-
ting co-owner can claim his share of any production less his proportionate share of
costs and expenses incurred in obtaining production. Huckabay v. Texas Co., 277 La.
191, 78 So. 2d 829 (1955).
118. LA. R.S. 31:176 (1974). The servitude owner may grant a lease covering the
full ownership of the servitude when necessary to prevent waste or extinction of the
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mineral lease may act independently to prevent waste or termination
of the lease, but he cannot impose any costs on his co-owners except
those arising out of production."9
If land is burdened by a mineral right (or by mineral rights)
created by fewer than all of the co-owners of the land, a judicial par-
tition must be by licitation unless the partition in kind results in the
surface and mineral value of each tract being in the same proportion
to the total value of the surface and mineral rights respectively as
each co-owner's interest bears to the whole of the surface and mineral
rights respectively. 2 ' Additionally, the partition in kind is not allowed
if it will "significantly impair" the owner's ability to develop the
minerals on his own tract. This presumption in favor of partition by
licitation when land is burdened by a mineral right created by fewer
than all of the co-owners of the land is in direct contrast to the general
presumption in favor of partition in kind.'
In Patrick v. Johnstone,'22 a partition proceeding was filed by the
owner of an undivided one-half interest in a tract of land against the
owner of the other undivided one-half interest, which was burdened
by a mineral servitude owned by another defendant. The second cir-
cuit noted that ordinarily the burden is upon the party requesting
a partition by licitation to show that the property is indivisible by
its nature or that loss or inconvenience to one of the owners would
result from dividing it. However, this presumption against licitation
can be overcome by proof that the land to be partitioned is burdened
by mineral rights created by fewer than all of the co-owners. After
such proof, a presumption arises in favor of partition by licitation
which can be rebutted only by proof that the requirements set forth
in article 178 of the Mineral Code have been met.123 In this case, the
defendant, who had requested a partition in kind, offered no evidence
whatsoever that the requirements of article 178 could be satisfied,
and a partition by licitation was affirmed. 24 Thus, it appears that a
co-owner of land can create a presumption in favor of partition by
servitude, but he must act in good faith and as a reasonably prudent mineral ser-
vitude owner.
119. LA. R.S. 31:177 (1974).
120. LA. R.S. 31:178 (1974 & Supp. 1982).
121. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1336, 1337, 1339; Babineaux v. Babineaux, 237 La. 806,
112 So. 2d 620 (1959).
122. 361 So. 2d 894 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1978), noted in Martin, The Work of the Loui-
siana Appellate Courts for the 1978-1979 Term-Mineral Rights, 40 LA. L. REV. 588,
591 (1980).
123. 361 So. 2d at 896-97.
124. Id. at 897.
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licitation merely by granting a mineral right, however small, burden-
ing the land.
In Thibaut v. Thibaut,125 a demand for partition by licitation of
land subject to mineral rights created by fewer than all of the co-
owners of the land was opposed based on allegations that the donated
mineral rights were relatively insignificant, were soon to prescribe,
and were of no proven value. The first circuit held that since there
was no evidence that the property could be partitioned in kind in
accordance with article 178 of the Mineral Code, the trial judge did
not err in ordering partition by licitation.
The owner of a mineral right is a necessary party to an action
for partition of the land burdened by the right, and if the owner of
the mineral right is not made a party to the partition proceeding af-
fecting his interest, the mineral right will not be extinguished or other-
wise affected."' Likewise, if the mineral rights of an owner are de-
rived from all of the co-owners of the land, whether by single or
separate acts, such rights are unaffected by a partition.' This
prevents co-owners of land, each of whom has consented to a par-
ticular mineral right, from forcing the sale of that mineral right by
licitation. On the other hand, as explained hereafter, any mineral lease
owner or servitude or royalty owner who has not acquired his mineral
right from all of the co-owners of the land should be aware that his
right could be extinguished if the land burdened by the right is parti-
tioned by licitation and the land is not adjudicated to the party who
created the right or to his successor.128
If partition is to be by licitation and the owner of mineral rights
derived from fewer than all of the co-owners of the land is made a
party to the action, the court must appoint two appraisers to separate-
ly value the interest of each party to the action in both the land and
the mineral rights.'29 A copy of the appraisal must be served upon
each party to the action together with notice that the appraisal may
be homologated after the expiration of 15 days from the date of
125. 407 So. 2d 466 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 409 So. 2d 659 (La. 1982).
126. LA. R.S. 31:179 (1974). The partition will not be invalid merely because the
owner of a mineral right burdening the land was not made a party to the proceeding,
but the mineral right itself will not be affected by the partition.
127. LA. R.S. 31:186 (1974). It is implied in article 186 that if the land to be parti-
tioned is burdened by mineral rights acquired from all of the co-owners, a partition
in kind of the surface can be achieved without affecting the outstanding mineral rights.
LA. R.S. 31:178 (1974), comment.
128. LA. R.S. 31:178, 31:187 (1974).
129. LA. R.S. 31:180 (1974).
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service.13' An opposition to the appraisal may be filed by any party
to the action at any time before homologation, and this opposition
is tried as a summary proceeding. 3' Failure to make an appraisal of
a mineral right as required by the Mineral Code does not invalidate
the partition, but in such event, the mineral right will not be ex-
tinguished or otherwise affected. 32
When a proper appraisal has been made and the owner of mineral
rights is entitled to.participate in the proceeds of the licitation, the
proceeds are distributed in the proportion that the homologated value
of the interest of each party who is entitled to participate in the sale
bears to the total homologated value of all of the interests of all of
the parties, but the mineral rights are extinguished by the sale. 3'
However, if the entirety of the land burdened by the mineral right
is adjudicated to the party who created such right or to his successor,
the mineral right is not extinguished or otherwise affected by the
sale and the mineral right owner has no interest in the proceeds of
the sale. In such event, the party purchasing the land is entitled to
a credit on the total purchase price equal to the proportionate value
of the preserved mineral right.3 '
Owners of mineral rights derived from fewer than all of the co-
owners of the land burdened by the mineral rights should be aware
that a partition by licitation will extinguish these mineral rights if
they are made parties to the proceedings and the rights are appraised
in accordance with the articles on appraisal, unless the co-owner gran-
ting the mineral right purchases the entirety of the land to be parti-
tioned at the licitation. The owner of such a mineral right can best
protect himself by opposing the appraisal of his interest before
homologation if said appraisal is too low and by bidding at the public
sale of the land burdened by the mineral right to assure that the
sale brings a fair sum.
In Harmon v. Whitten,3 ' the second circuit discussed but did not
rule upon the applicability of article 179 of the Mineral Code to mineral
rights acquired while a suit to partition by licitation the burdened
land was pending. The court implied that one who purchased a mineral
right during the pendency of a partition proceeding need not be made
130. LA. R.S. 31:181 (1974).
131. LA. R.S. 31:182 (1974).
132. LA. R.S. 31:184 (1974).
133. LA. R.S. 31:183, 31:185 (1974).
134. LA. R.S. 31:187 (1974).
135. 390 So. 2d 962 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1980), writ refused, 396 So. 2d 899 (La. 1981).
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a party to the suit in order for the partition sale to extinguish that
mineral right.136
As noted previously, a landowner does not own the oil and gas
beneath the surface of his land but merely has the right to explore
for and reduce to possession the oil and gas beneath his land."7 This
is called the "rule of capture," but it has been modified somewhat
by the Conservation Statute.13' The Commissioner of Conservation may
create a unit139 or units to avoid the drilling of unnecessary wells and
to prevent waste, each unit consisting of the maximum area which
may be efficiently and economically drained by one well. Unitization
modifies the rule of capture to ensure that each tract within the unit
will receive its just and equitable share of production from the reser-
voir for which the unit was created. 4 Each owner of a mineral in-
terest in each tract included within a unit is entitled to share in the
production from that unit, and this production may be "held in com-
mon" by the owners of the mineral interest.
It seems clear that oil and gas will not be reduced to possession
and ownership until severance occurs at the wellhead. 4' If oil is pro-
duced, each owner can easily take his share of production in kind and
dispose of it in his sole discretion, subject to any contractual limita-
tions agreed to between and among the parties involved. However,
gas is not susceptible to storage or division in kind; absent an agree-
ment between and among the co-owners of gas production, therefore,
a potential problems exists regarding the management and disposi-
tion of this commonly-held property. If each co-owner owns an un-
136. 390 So. 2d at 968-69; see also Amerada Petroleum Corp. v. Reese, 195 La. 359,
196 So. 558 (1940); Martin Timber Co. v. Roy, 147 So. 2d 699 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962),
rev'd, 244 La. 1050, 156 So. 2d 435 (1963).
137. LA. R.S. 31:6-31:7 (1974); Desormeaux v. Inexco Oil Co., 298 So. 2d 897 (La.
App. 3d Cir.), writ refused, 302 So. 2d 37 (1974).
138. LA. R.S. tit. 30 (1950).
139. "Unit" is defined in LA. R.S. 31:213(6) (Supp. 1982) as follows:
"Unit" means an area of land, deposit, or deposits of minerals, stratum or strata,
or pool or pools, or a part or parts thereof, as to which parties with interests
therein are bound to share minerals produced on a specified basis and as to which
those having the right to conduct drilling or mining operations therein are bound
to share investment and operating costs on a specified basis. A unit may be
formed by convention or by order of an agency of the state or federal govern-
ment empowered to do so. A unit formed by order of a governmental agency
is termed a "compulsory unit."
140. LA. R.S. 30:9 (1950 & Supp. 1960 & 1980).
141. LA. R.S. 47:634(3) (1950); see Sartor v. United Carbon Co., 183 La. 287, 163 So.
103 (1935); cf Texas Co. v. Fontenot, 200 La. 753, 8 So. 2d 689 (1942) (severance tax
due when natural resources extracted from ground).
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divided interest in each molecule or cubic foot of gas produced from
the unit well, then it could be argued that management or disposition
of any of the gas requires the consent of all co-owners. On the other
hand, if a co-owner of gas production has a right only to his pro rata
share of production, then it could be argued that any co-owner may
produce and dispose of his share of production in his sole discretion,
provided sufficient gas remains in the reservoir for the remaining co-
owners to obtain their pro rata shares of production.
As a practical matter, a lessee of a mineral lease generally has
the right and obligation to market the gas of its lessor, and lessees
will usually agree to a gas balancing agreement or a gas purchase
contract prior to or shortly after a well is drilled and completed and
a unit is formed. In those instances in which all of the co-owners of
production have not agreed on its disposition, the use of partition may
block a recalcitrant co-owner's efforts to prevent the sale or other
disposition of the production. If partition is available, it will be
necessary to determine exactly what property or rights are held in
common, whether the property can be divided in kind by a gas balanc-
ing agreement or otherwise, and, if the property or rights are to be
partitioned by licitation, whether the procedure set forth in articles
180-187 of the Mineral Code will apply.
Anyone who holds property in common with another can compel
a partition of said property. "2 Equitable considerations are generally
not relevant in determining whether or not partition is proper.
However, equitable considerations should be a factor in determining
the method of partition.
142. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1289.
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